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CAMPAIGN SPEECH AND CONTEXTUAL 
ANALYSIS 
MIRIAM GALSTON∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Within days of the 2006 mid-term elections, political 
commentators began discussing the vast sums of money that candidates 
in 2008 will have to raise in order to have a viable candidacy in the 
primaries or general election.  Analysts noted that aggregate spending on 
behalf of candidates for federal office in 2006 would likely be roughly 
$2.6 billion, an eighteen-percent increase over the comparable spending 
in the 2002 mid-term election.1  The amounts raised in the first two 
                                                          
∗ Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School.  B.A., 
Cornell University, Ph.D., University of Chicago, J.D., Yale Law School.  The 
author is grateful for the financial assistance provided by the George Washington 
Law School.  The author is also indebted to Bill Galston, Michael Malbin, and Steve 
Weissman for their comments on an earlier draft of this article and to Matthew 
Mantel, Jennifer McClure, Kaitlin Dunne, Virginia Wolk, and Mary Wrightson for 
their outstanding research assistance. 
1. Barbara Borst, Campaign Spending Up in U.S. Congressional Races, USA 
TODAY, Oct. 29, 2006 (reporting a prediction made by the Center for Responsive 
Politics), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-10-29-
campaign-spending_x.htm.  According to the Federal Election Commission, 
congressional candidates alone raised 30 percent more and spent 36 percent more in 
2006 than congressional candidates in 2004.  See Press Release, Federal Election 
Commission, Congressional Campaigns Spend $966 Million through Mid October 
(Nov. 2, 2006) available at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2006/20061102can/20061 
102can.html.  The larger figure predicted by the Center for Responsive Politics 
includes funds raised by parties and interest groups for congressional races in those 
years in addition to the sums raised by the candidates. 
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quarters of 2007 by candidates for President were similarly 
unprecedented.2  
Concurrent with these developments, campaign finance reform 
initiatives have continued to surface.  Recent ethics reform legislation, 
for example, includes a provision to increase campaign finance 
transparency by requiring lobbyists who bundle small individual 
contributions for the benefit of candidates to disclose the candidates, 
political parties, or other recipients for whom they raise money and the 
aggregate amounts raised in this way.3  At the same time, lawmakers 
have renewed their efforts to restrain certain types of soft money 
fundraising by introducing the 527 Reform Act of 2007.4  In the courts,5 
the sponsors of the McCain-Feingold 2002 campaign finance law 
(Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 or BCRA)6 have persisted in 
their attempts to compel the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to 
adopt regulations specifying which organizations must register as 
political committees under the federal campaign finance law (FECA)7 
and be subject to its fundraising8 and disclosure rules.9  In part prodded 
                                                          
2. The Campaign Finance Institute, The Presidential Campaigns Are Setting 
Records, http://www.cfinst.org/pr/prRelease.aspx?ReleaseID=155 (stating that the 
presidential candidates raised a total of $277 million in the first six months of 2007). 
3. See Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 
110-81, 121 Stat. 735 (2007), § 204. 
4. See 527 Reform Act of 2007, S. 463, 110th Cong. (2007), H.R. 420, 110th 
Cong. (2007). 
5. See Shays v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 424 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D.D.C. 2006), 
(involving a suit filed in 2004 by sponsors of the McCain-Feingold legislation in the 
House of Representatives).  The plaintiffs alleged that the FEC had failed in its duty 
to enforce the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act because it never promulgated a rule 
outlining what actions or characteristics make an organization a political committee 
subject to the Federal Election Campaign Act.  The court ordered the FEC to 
promulgate such a rule or else offer an explanation why it believed case-by-case 
enforcement was the proper method for enforcement. 
6. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 
81 (2002) (codified as part of FECA, infra note 7). 
7. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 431 et. seq. (2000). 
8. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (2000) (limiting contributions made by 
individuals to political committees to $5,000 per election cycle), 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) 
(2000) (prohibiting corporations and unions from contributing money from their 
general treasuries to political committees). 
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by these proceedings, the FEC recently announced a series of 
enforcement actions against groups that had failed to register as political 
committees,10 and it published an explanation and defense of its decision 
to enforce certain campaign finance violations on a case-by-case basis 
rather than by promulgating a regulation of the sort reformers insist is 
necessary.11  Clearly campaign finance law and regulation is still in flux.  
This provides an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of reforms 
instituted to date as well as current efforts of reformers to revise and 
improve perceived deficiencies in the existing statutory and regulatory 
framework.  An assessment of this kind requires, however, that we step 
back and revisit the objectives of campaign finance legislation.  At least 
three primary purposes suggest themselves. 
First and foremost, campaign fundraising should not provide an 
occasion for buying or selling a legislative agenda or specific legislative 
proposals, influencing other legislative action or inaction (e.g., in 
connection with nominations, appointments, or government contracts), or 
even granting special access to lawmakers and their staffs. 
Second, campaign finance rules should apply with equal force to 
all participants in elections who are similarly situated from a functional 
                                                          
9. See 2 U.S.C. § 433 (2000) (describing registration requirements), 2 U.S.C. § 
434 (2000) (describing reporting requirements). 
10. See MURs 5430 and 5466 (August 24, 2007) (fining Americans Coming 
Together (ACT)); MUR 5753 (December 13, 2006) (fining the League of 
Conservation Voters, two 527 groups, and the organization’s Action Fund); MUR 
5487 (February 28, 2007) (fining the Progress for America Voting Fund); MURs 
5511 and 5525 (December 13, 2006) (fining Swift Boat Veterans and POWs for 
Truth); MUR 5754 (Dec. 13, 2006) (fining the MoveOn.org Voter Fund).  All of 
these conciliation agreements and the associated documents are available at 
http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqs/searcheqs?SUBMIT=continue.  Most of the MURs cited in 
this note are summarized in FEC Notice 2007-3 (“Political Committee Status”), 72 
Fed. Reg. 5595, 5604-5605 (Feb. 7, 2007) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. Pt. 100). In 
addition to paying the fines, each organization agreed to register as a political 
committee under FECA if it continued to engage in the activities that were the 
subject of the enforcement proceedings. 
11. See FEC Notice 2007-3, supra note 10, and infra note 125 and 
accompanying text.  The plaintiffs in Shays found the Notice unacceptable and filed 
a motion alleging that the agency had failed to comply satisfactorily with the court’s 
directive.  The court disagreed.  See Shays v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 63688, 2007 WL 2446159 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2007). 
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point of view.  Loopholes and the unfairness surrounding them may arise 
when rules are interpreted so as to permit labels or technical distinctions 
rather than substance to determine outcomes.  Fairness requires that 
function, not form, determine the proper application of campaign finance 
obligations and entitlements. 
Finally, because of the protection afforded speech by the First 
Amendment, the articulation of rules must be clear enough and their 
application sufficiently certain that affected parties can understand their 
rights and the limits of those rights, so that they can make plans and 
adopt strategies in reliance on the rules.  Thus, both constitutional 
considerations and fairness to participants in an election require that legal 
criteria be sufficiently fixed in their meanings and purposes that 
reasonable people acting in good faith can anticipate the consequences of 
their actions. 
This Article explores certain tensions inherent in achieving these 
three goals simultaneously.  The starting point of my analysis is a recent 
empirical study detailing the extent to which, and the ways in which, 
organizations exempt from taxation under § 527 or § 501(a) of the 
Internal Revenue Code (the Code)12 engage in campaign activity by 
operating as part of networks of commonly managed nonprofits.  Part I 
discusses the legal and policy concerns that have triggered campaign 
finance reforms in the last decade.  Specifically, it examines problems 
raised by politically active exempt organizations that operate as part of 
networks of related organizations.  Part II describes the results of the 
empirical study about the incidence and characteristics of networks of 
politically active exempt organizations that was issued under the 
auspices of the Campaign Finance Institute.13  Based largely upon the 
study’s findings, I develop certain recommendations for assessing the 
electoral mission of individual advocacy organizations operating as part 
of networks.  I refer to my recommendations, which are designed to take 
into account the complex interactions between and among such 
                                                          
12. All references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. 
13. See Stephen R. Weissman and Kara D. Ryan, The Campaign Finance 
Institute, Non-Profit Interest Groups’ Election Activities and Federal Campaign 
Finance Policy: A Working Paper (2006),   http://www.cfinst.org/books_reports/pdf/ 
NonprofitsWorkingPaper.pdf.  A revised version was printed (without the 
appendices) in 54 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 21 (2006). 
FALR%20SSRN%20DOCUMENT[1].DOC 11/28/2007  2:13 PM 
104 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 6 
 
politically active affiliated organizations, as a “network approach.”  Part 
III examines First Amendment difficulties raised by analyzing such 
organizations using a network approach.  It focuses on a line of cases 
holding that the government cannot condition tax and other financial 
benefits on a potential recipient surrendering free speech rights that it 
otherwise would have unless there is an alternate channel available for 
the recipient to exercise those rights.  Part IV asks whether this alternate-
channel doctrine is inconsistent with using a network approach to 
classifying exempt organizations as political committees.  It also 
examines whether the doctrine of respecting corporate and entity 
boundaries except in unusual circumstances would run counter to a 
network approach.  In Part V, the FEC’s use of contextual analysis, such 
as a network approach would entail, is discussed and the potential impact 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life is 
considered. 
I.  THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION 
Since 1971, when it enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act, 
(FECA),14 Congress has attempted to prevent corruption or the 
appearance of corruption in federal elections resulting either from 
campaign contributions made to the candidates and political parties or 
from expenditures made on their behalf.  In general, Congress has 
attempted to achieve its objective in two ways: (1) by enacting limits on 
the amount of contributions that individuals and entities can give to 
candidates or parties, by year or by election cycle (the “amount” 
restrictions),15 and (2) by requiring disclosure on the part of those who 
receive and spend campaign funds.16  A third strategy for preventing 
corruption, introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century, has been 
to prohibit corporations, labor unions, and national banks from spending 
their general treasury funds on certain kinds of campaign activity (the 
“source” restrictions).17  Although these entities cannot spend funds from 
                                                          
14. See supra note 7. 
15. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (2000). 
16. 2 U.S.C. §§ 433, 434 (2000). 
17. The source restrictions are now part of FECA.  See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) 
(2000).  For the history of the rules limiting corporate funding of election activities, 
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their general treasuries,18 they are free to set up political action 
committees, or PACs, and solicit contributions to them from related 
individuals.19  The PACs are then able to make contributions to 
candidates and parties and to engage in all forms of campaign spending.  
Money raised in accordance with the preceding disclosure, amount, and 
source restrictions is known as “hard money.”  Everything else is “soft 
money.”20 
The Supreme Court closely polices Congress’s efforts to regulate 
campaign financing in order to prevent Congress from violating the First 
Amendment by restricting political speech through regulations that are 
overly broad or vague or that cannot be justified by the government 
interest served.  In 2003, the Court upheld against a First Amendment 
attack a provision of the McCain-Feingold reform legislation that 
prohibited candidates and political parties from raising and spending soft 
money either for themselves or for state organizations.21  The Court also 
validated companion provisions prohibiting political parties (federal, 
state, or local) from raising soft money for § 527 organizations22 or for § 
501(c) organizations that make expenditures or disbursements on behalf 
of federal candidates.23 
                                                          
see FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152-55 (2003).  For the history of restrictions 
on union funding of campaign activities, see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 116-
17 (2003). 
18. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2007). 
19. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (2000). Corporations may solicit 
contributions for their PACs from shareholders and executive and administrative 
employees (and the families of all of these), see 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i) (2000), 
and labor organizations may solicit contributions for their PACs from members and 
their families, see 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A)(ii) (2000). 
20. On the meaning of the term “soft money,” see McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122-
23.  The term did not appear in FECA or the implementing regulations until the 
enactment of BCRA in 2002.  Even now, although the term appears in the title to § 
441i of FECA, it is not defined in the statute. 
21. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 142-73. 
22. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441i(d)(1)-(2) (2000); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 174-81.  
The prohibition does not apply in the case of a 527 organization that is registered 
with the FEC as a political committee or that is a nonfederal candidate or nonfederal 
party committee. 
23. See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(d)(1) (2000); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 181-83 
(2003). 
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Since the enactment of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance 
legislation, reformers have become concerned that certain nonprofit 
organizations are becoming vehicles for evading the soft money 
restrictions.  In particular, attention has focused on groups organized 
under § 527 of the Code, the provision for “political organizations.”  
Groups that qualify under that section are exempt from income tax on 
contributions made to them and certain other revenues they generate to 
the extent that these sums are segregated for use in influencing, or 
attempting to influence, the nomination, appointment, or election of 
individuals for public office.24  In addition, contributors to such groups 
are not liable for the gift tax when the amounts they contribute exceed 
the annual gift tax exclusion.25 
Some groups organized under § 527 of the Internal Revenue 
Code are required to register as political committees with the FEC 
because of the type and amount of their political activity.  Once 
registered, a group will be subject to the source, amount, and disclosure 
rules set forth in FECA with respect to its federal campaign activities.26  
Under FECA, registration with the FEC is required if a group raises or 
spends more than $1,000 “for the purpose of influencing any election for 
federal office.”27  In addition to this statutory requirement, the Supreme 
Court has suggested that before an entity can be required to register with 
the FEC, it must either be under the control of a candidate for federal 
office or have the election or defeat of a federal candidate as its major 
purpose.28  Most commentators agree that the FECA registration 
                                                          
24. See I.R.C. §§ 527(a), (c)(1), (e)(2) (2000).  The groups are, however, 
taxable on their net investment income and certain capital gains, and they may be 
taxable on other income that is not raised and spent for “exempt function” purposes 
or is not properly segregated for such purposes.  Section 527 of the Code applies to 
activities designed to influence elections at the state or local as well as the federal 
level, and it also extends to activities related to non-elective offices.  The rules set 
forth in FECA and its implementing regulations, in contrast, apply only to federal 
activities and elective offices. 
25. See I.R.C. § 2501(a)(4) (2000). 
26. A political committee is also permitted to maintain a non-federal account 
to fund its non-federal activities.  See 11 CFR § 106.6 (2007). 
27. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(4)(A) (2000) (defining political committee), (8)(A)(i) 
(2000) (defining contribution), (9)(A)(i) (2000) (defining expenditure). 
28. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976).  According to the Supreme 
Court in FEC v Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986), an 
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requirement is triggered only if an organization satisfies both the 
statutory and the judicially created tests.29 
Under current law, it is often unclear whether a 527 organization 
that is active during a federal election conforms to these legal standards 
and, as a consequence, must register as a political committee with the 
FEC.  Some 527 groups active in recent federal elections have registered 
with the FEC as political committees and, thus, have voluntarily 
submitted to FECA regulation.  Other 527 groups  have taken the 
position that they did not need to register, either because their electoral 
activities were not the type that trigger such regulation30 or because their 
FECA-type activities constituted a small part of their mission and 
                                                          
organization may become subject to the FECA registration requirement if its 
independent expenditures become so “extensive” that “its major purpose may be 
regarded as campaign activity.”  The MCFL formulation is ambiguous: it may mean 
that an organization could become a political committee if independent spending 
becomes its major purpose, or it may mean that “extensive” amounts of independent 
spending may be an important, or even conclusive, indication that an organization’s 
major purpose is to influence the election of candidates for federal office.  
“Independent expenditures” are defined as spending for express advocacy that is not 
coordinated with a candidate or political party.  2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2000).  The term 
“express advocacy” refers to communications like “Elect Smith” or “Defeat Jones.”  
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14, 41-44, 80 (1976). 
29. See FEC Notice 2007-3, supra note 10, at 5596-97 (stating the FEC’s 
position).  For a discussion of other authorities as well as the development of the 
FEC’s position, see Miriam Galston, Emerging Constitutional Paradigms and 
Justifications for Campaign Finance Regulation: The Case of 527 Groups, 95 GEO. 
L.J. 1181, 1220-21 (2007). 
30. According to these groups, only campaign activities that are “express 
advocacy” count in determining whether an organization has satisfied either the 
statutory or the judicially created standard.  See Wis. Right to Life v. Paradise, 138 
F.3d 1183, 1186 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 873 (1998); see also Nat’l 
Fed’n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1323 (S.D. 
Ala. 2002), rev’d sub nom. Mobile Republican Assemblies v. United States, 353 
F.3d 1357, 1359-60 (10th Cir. 2003).  The FEC agrees that only express advocacy 
can be counted in assessing the extent of a group’s expenditures for FECA purposes.  
See Notice 2007-3, supra note 10, at 5597.  However, it argues that the definition of 
a contribution includes a much broader range of campaign related activities, 
including communications that support or attack a candidate for federal office, even 
if they do not expressly advocate the candidate’s election or defeat.  See id. at 5602. 
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operations.31  As a consequence, the latter groups have been able to raise 
soft money, i.e., sums in excess of the hard-money limits32 and 
contributions made from unions’ and corporations’ general treasury 
funds.33  Although it is primarily the unregistered 527 groups that have 
been charged by critics with making it possible to circumvent the soft 
money reforms enacted in 2002, it is also possible for groups described 
in 501(c) of the Code to be implicated in circumvention.  In 2006, for 
example, the FEC found that an organization operating under § 501(c)(4) 
of the Code should have registered as a political committee with the 
FEC, and the agency indicated that it would continue to investigate 
organizations active in political campaigns without regard to the section 
of the Code underlying a group’s exemption.34 
Whether an unregistered 527 or 501(c) group is operating within 
the law or should be registered with the FEC depends upon three issues: 
(1) what kind of electioneering activities are counted for determining 
registration; (2) how extensive these electioneering activities must be for 
a group to have influencing federal elections as its major purpose; and 
(3) what method should be used to assess an organization’s major 
                                                          
31. In response to its concern that many 527 groups have wrongly failed to 
register, each Congress since 2004 has introduced a “527 Reform Act,” designed to 
require 527 groups engaged in even minimal amounts of certain kinds of election 
activities to register with the FEC.  See Reform of Section 527 Organizations, SA 
2958, 109th Cong. (2006); Lobbying Accountability and Transparency Act, H.R. 
4975, 109th Cong. (2006); 527 Reform Act of 2006, H.R. 513, 109th Cong. (2006); 
S. 1053, 109th Cong. (2005); 527 Reform Act of 2005, S. 271, 109th Cong. (2005);   
527 Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 513, 109th Cong. (2005); 527 Reform Act of 2004, S. 
2828, 108th Cong. (2004);  527 Reform Act of 2004, H.R. 5127, 108th Cong. 
(2004).   See also supra note 4. 
32. More than 150 individuals contributed $100,000 or more and twenty-four 
people gave $2,000,000 or more during the 2004 election.  See PoliticalMoneyLine, 
2004 Cycle Large Donors to CQLine’s Key 527 Groups, http://www.fecinfo.com/cgi 
-win/irs_ef_527.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 (listing, based upon I.R.S. filings, large 
contributors to 527 groups in the 2004 election cycle).  Some of the 527 groups 
listed on the website were registered as political committees under FECA and 
maintained both federal and nonfederal accounts. 
33. See Weissman and Ryan, supra note 13, at 90-91, who observe that, 
although unions contributed large sums during the 2004 campaign to certain 527 
groups not registered with the FEC, corporations contributed relatively little to them.  
34. See Notice 2007-3, supra note 10, at 5605-06. 
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purpose.35  Although the first two questions are critical to a final 
resolution of the problem of registration, this Article focuses primarily 
on the last, or methodological, question. 
II.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND A NETWORK APPROACH 
In the past, the determination of an organization’s major purpose 
has been made by looking at the group in isolation and assessing the 
relative importance of its various activities.  That this method may not 
accurately identify an organization’s primary mission is one inference 
that can be drawn from the empirical investigation of politically active 
exempt organizations published in 2006 by Steve Weissman and Kara 
Ryan.  The authors examined “12 major nonprofit interest groups that 
were heavily involved in influencing federal elections . . . ([from] 2000 
through 2004).”36  Half of the groups studied were Republican in 
orientation and half were oriented toward the Democratic party.  The 
groups investigated spanned a wide range of interests (business, labor, 
issues, and party support), and they organized under §§ 501(c)(4)-
501(c)(6) of the Code or as registered or unregistered 527s.37  The 
authors found that all but two of the twelve entities studied had at least 
one affiliated organization that was commonly managed.38  Most of the 
501(c)(4)s, (5)s, and (6)s were affiliated with an unregistered 527, a 
                                                          
35. On one level, the ambiguity surrounding the scope of the relevant election-
related activity is irrelevant for the question examined in this paper.  On another 
level, the broader the definition of the relevant electoral activity, the more far-
reaching would be the impact of the network approach. 
36. Weissman & Ryan, supra note 13, at 2 (alteration added). 
37. Id. at 2-5.  The authors selected groups that were in existence for more than 
one election cycle.  Thus, they did not study groups like Americans Coming 
Together (ACT) or Swift Boat Veterans, since such groups were established for the 
2004 presidential election and were “no longer active” after that.  Id. at 2.  In this 
sentence and the rest of the Article, the phrase “unregistered 527” refers to a 527 
group that has not registered with the FEC.  Such a group would, however, have to 
register with the IRS and be subject to the reporting and disclosure rules provided for 
in § 527 and the accompanying regulations. 
38. Id. at 5.  The groups studied that had no commonly managed affiliates 
were Progress for America, a 527 group that did not register with the FEC as a 
political committee, and Americans for Job Security, a §501(c)(6) organization. 
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registered 527, or both.39  Six instances involved a pair of 527 groups, 
one of which was registered with the FEC and one of which was not. 
Several of the 501(c) organizations were active in federal elections using 
their general funds, rather than, or in addition to, working through an 
associated PAC, because IRS rules permit such organizations to engage 
in a significant amount of electioneering in their own right (although 
they may be subject to tax on the amounts thus spent).40 
Based upon an analysis of their findings, Weissman and Ryan 
conclude that the current debate about the proper treatment of 527 groups 
and other advocacy nonprofits is inadequate because it “has failed to 
incorporate a real world understanding of the specific ways in which 
various nonprofit interest groups—and their large donors—engage in 
elections and relate to campaigns.”41  They argue that an accurate 
assessment of the role of such groups in elections “must take into 
account all of an interest group’s cumulative and coordinated election 
activities,”42 which would include the activities of the other members of 
the network, rather than looking at individual members in the network in 
isolation.43 
                                                          
39. Id. at 6. 
40. Id. at 6.  Section 527(f) of the Code provides that 501(c) groups that 
engage in 527-type election activities using their own funds, without creating a 527 
organization to pursue those activities, must pay a tax on the amount they spend on 
such activities or on their net investment income, whichever is less.  One 
consequence of this formula is that a 501(c) group can engage in 527-type activities 
without using a 527 organization, yet without the risk of taxation, if it has little or no 
net investment income.  For example, unions tend to have endowments generating 
considerable net investment income; however, organizations that spend virtually all 
their annual revenues each year tend not to have much, if any, net investment income 
and thus could engage in political activity without any tax exposure under the “lesser 
of” formula.  There would still be some limits on the amount of political activity 
such organizations could undertake because groups exempt under § 501(a) of the 
Code must be primarily engaged in their exempt purpose, and political activity is not 
an exempt purpose for § 501(c) groups. 
41. Id. at 3; see also id. at 31. 
42. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
43. Weissman and Ryan reach these conclusions about the nature of the 
activities of groups that operate as part of a network.  They do not, however, take a 
position on the implications of their findings for federal campaign finance law.  Id. at 
31-32. 
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Although Weissman and Ryan make no recommendations for 
reforming the regulation of campaign finance, their findings suggest the 
need to reconsider the manner in which campaign finance law should be 
applied to groups operating as part of a network. In particular, in light of 
the pervasiveness of affiliated groups of nonprofits, it would seem 
desirable to adopt a network approach in applying campaign finance 
rules, especially when deciding which groups should register as political 
committees under FECA.  This result is dictated by the fact that the state 
interest in imposing restrictions on political speech in FECA is to avoid 
corruption or the appearance of corruption. Corruption is a broad 
concept.  It includes public officials granting special access and influence 
to contributors as well as quid pro quo transactions, in which public 
officials sponsor (or oppose) specific legislation or commit to some other 
action in exchange for campaign contributions.44  As Weissman and 
Ryan observe, focusing on organizational networks is important because 
the impact of individual entities (and their donors) on the perceptions of 
candidates and parties is likely to be a function of the conduct of the 
entire network rather than the conduct of the individual members.45  In 
other words, networks matter for assessing the risk of corruption or its 
appearance because candidates and office holders typically will view the 
network as a unitary group, even if the members of the network are 
independent legal entities and do not coordinate with one another.  
Indeed, often the names of several members of a network of affiliated 
groups share common elements, like “MoveOn.org Voter Fund,” 
                                                          
44. For the evolution of the constitutional jurisprudence relating to the concept 
of corruption, see Galston, supra note 29, at 1229-35 and the sources cited.  See also 
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2678 (2007) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (criticizing the “new” theory of corruption recognized in Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) on the ground that it 
was inconsistent with First National Bank v. Bellotti and Buckley v. Valeo). 
45. See Weissman & Ryan, supra note 13, at 3.  See also id. at 27 (noting that 
the result, when a donor can contribute large sums of soft money while also 
contributing hard money to a range of candidates, is to create the appearance of a 
“unified strategy” on the part of the donor).  Despite this result, Weissman and Ryan 
claim that, as a policy matter, it is still possible to “maintain that the benefits brought 
to our democratic conversation by nonprofit advocacy and civic engagement 
outweigh the costs of potential big donor influence over its outcome and elected 
officials.”  Id. at 31. 
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“MoveOn.org Civic Action,” and “MoveOn.org Political Action.”  They 
may be located at the same address or share offices or a website.46  Most 
importantly, the member groups are commonly managed and share some 
or all of their staff.  As a consequence, members of a network of 
organizations will be acting in concert or appear to be acting in concert 
in the eyes of candidates for office and the public at large.  In such 
situations, an office holder’s sense of gratitude is likely to be prompted 
by the aggregate influence of the members of a network rather than 
compartmentalized to reflect formal indicia of corporate boundaries 
buried deep in some filing office in a state capital. 
Thus, if each member of a network is examined separately to 
determine if it should register with the FEC as a political committee and 
be subject to FECA’s source, amount, and disclosure rules, the result will 
be as follows. The member of the network that is registered as a political 
committee will engage in activities that explicitly urge or work toward 
the election or defeat of a specific candidate.  Because it is a registered 
political committee, its ability to raise money will be constrained by 
FECA’s rules that cap the amount it can receive from individuals and 
groups as well as by the rules preventing it from accepting money from 
corporations and unions (other than from their PACs, which raise money 
subject to the same limitations).  Another member of the network may 
not be registered as a political committee and, thus, it will be able to 
accept unlimited amounts of money from individuals, corporations, and 
unions (the latter two groups using their general treasury funds rather 
than the less abundant money they have in their PACs).  If the registered 
member raises $N, the unregistered member may raise another $N, $3N, 
or more because it is not constrained by the source and amount rules.47  
                                                          
46. See, e.g., http://www.moveon.org/about.html (web page for the “MoveOn 
Family of Organizations”) (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).  MoveOn.org Voter Fund, an 
unregistered 527 group, is no longer in existence.  See MUR 5754, supra note 10.  
MoveOn.org Civic Action is a section 501(c)(4) organization.  MoveOn.org Political 
Action is a 527 group registered with the FEC. 
47. See Weissman & Ryan, supra note 13, at 9-10.  In the 2004 presidential 
cycle, for example, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) spent roughly 
$12.5 million from its registered PAC and $46.7 million from its unregistered 527 
group.  Id. The Sierra Club spent $882,525 from its registered PAC and $6.26 
million from its unregistered 527 group.  Id.  The Club for Growth spent $1.9 
million from its registered PAC and $9.6 million from its unregistered 527 group.  
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Thus, the amount that a candidate receives from the overtly political, 
registered member is magnified by the additional sums spent by the 
unregistered member, and a candidate or the public is likely to perceive 
that the aggregate amount was spent by a single organization on the 
candidate’s behalf.  The influence the network can have on the candidate 
is commensurately increased, as is the potential for corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.  Add to this the fact that the unregistered 
member can engage in numerous activities that are likely to be perceived 
as unambiguously attempting to influence a campaign for federal office 
by anyone not trained in the Byzantine complexities of FECA,48 and a 
candidate would be reasonable in assuming that either member of the 
network was devoting all the network’s resources to electing the 
candidate or defeating his or her opponent. 
If we believe that the law should regulate the world as it really is, 
it follows that the real world flow of money and influence should be an 
important datum for designing campaign finance regulation from both a 
legal and a policy perspective.  Thus, a network approach should provide 
an attractive model for lawmakers involved in campaign finance reform 
to consider when drafting rules for determining when an organization 
should be classified as a political committee and required to observe the 
reporting, source, and amount rules of FECA. 
III.  TAXATION WITH REPRESENTATION OF WASHINGTON AND 
THE ALTERNATE CHANNEL DOCTRINE 
Nonetheless, there exists a potential constitutional barrier to the 
network approach that  derives from a 1983 Supreme Court case, Regan 
v. Taxation with Representation of Washington (TWR).49  The decision 
centered on a challenge to the provision in the Internal Revenue Code 
                                                          
Id.  MoveOn.Org spent $30 million from its registered PAC and $21 million from its 
unregistered 527 group.  Id. 
48. For example, according to the FEC, in general, expenditures for messages 
that support or oppose a candidate for federal office are not considered the type of 
campaign expenditures that are counted to determine if an entity is a political 
committee unless the messages expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified federal candidate.   See Notice 2007-3, supra note 10, at 5604. 
49. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
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that prohibits § 501(c)(3) organizations from engaging in substantial 
amounts of lobbying.50  The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that 
the lobbying restriction unconstitutionally conditioned their entitlement 
to charitable tax status on surrendering a considerable portion of their 
ability to engage in speech protected by the First Amendment.51 
In upholding the tax law’s limitation on the amount of 
permissible lobbying, the Court first likened the tax exemption to a 
government subsidy52 and then noted that Congress was under no 
obligation to subsidize even constitutionally protected speech. Because 
the plaintiff in TWR was a § 501(c)(3) organization, it received two tax 
benefits: exemption from income taxation at the entity level and the 
ability to raise money from contributions favored by the charitable 
contribution deduction.53  The Court observed that TWR was free to 
establish a sister exempt organization, which would be unable to receive 
deductible contributions, that could lobby on behalf of TWR, as long as 
the second organization did not receive any funds from TWR.54  This 
bifurcated arrangement would secure Congress’s goal of preventing sums 
raised through deductible contributions being used to fund substantial 
lobbying, while providing TWR with an ample alternative channel for 
lobbying to promote its mission. 
The alternate channel option was critical to upholding the 
lobbying limitation in the Code, according to Justice Blackmun, who 
                                                          
50. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000);  see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
1(b)(3)(i), -1(c)(3)(ii), (iv) (2007). 
51. TWR, 461 U.S. at 542. 
52. Id. at 544 (“A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to 
the organization of the amount of tax that it would have to pay on its income.”).  The 
Court did not, however, fully equate exemptions with subsidies, noting that they are 
not in all respects identical.  Id. at 544, n.5 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 
664, 674-76 (1970)). 
53. See I.R.C. § 170(a) (2000).  Strictly speaking, the charitable contribution 
deduction is a subsidy to the donor, whose taxable income is reduced.  The Court 
and most commentators, however, view the donor’s subsidy as a tax benefit to the 
recipient organization as well since it makes it easier for the organization to raise 
money. 
54. In fact, an uncontested fact in the case was that TWR had originally 
operated through a § 501(c)(3) organization and an affiliated § 501(c)(4) group, and 
that the latter had engaged in most of the lobbying related to the goals of both 
organizations.  See TWR, 461 U.S. at 543. 
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wrote the concurrence.  Although the decision for the Court also 
mentioned the option, it did not appear to have the same centrality for the 
decision as it did for the concurrence.  Blackmun agreed with the 
majority that “merely [refusing] to pay for the lobbying out of public 
[moneys]” does not implicate the First Amendment.55  However, he also 
believed that it would violate the First Amendment to deprive the 
organization of its right to petition government.  The alternative channel 
option enabled TWR, and thus Blackmun, to reconcile the law’s 
competing objectives.  Further, because of his insistence on the 
organization’s constitutional right to lobby to make its views known to 
lawmakers, Blackmun emphasized that TWR must be permitted not only 
to establish but also to control its 501(c)(4) affiliate.56 
Should the IRS attempt to limit the control these 
organizations exercise over the lobbying of their §  
501(c)(4) affiliates, the First Amendment problems 
would be insurmountable.  It hardly answers one 
person’s objection to a restriction on his speech 
that another person, outside his control, may speak 
for him.  Similarly, an attempt to prevent §  
501(c)(4) organizations from lobbying explicitly on 
behalf of their §  501(c)(3) affiliates would 
perpetuate §  501(c)(3) organizations’ inability to 
make known their views on legislation without 
incurring the unconstitutional penalty.  Such 
restrictions would extend far beyond Congress’ 
mere refusal to subsidize lobbying.57 
For Blackmun, then, the existence of an alternate channel for speech was 
absolutely necessary to prevent an “insurmountable” constitutional 
defect.58 
TWR was a unanimous decision and, thus, the Supreme Court  
did not need Blackmun’s concurrrence to uphold the constitutionality of 
the lobbying limitation.  As a result, if the decision is viewed in isolation, 
                                                          
55. TWR, 461 U.S. at 545 (majority opinion) (alteration added), 551-52 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
56. Id. at 552-53. 
57. Id. at 553. 
58. Id. 
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it is possible that the alternative channel doctrine might not be seen as an 
integral part of the decision’s reasoning in the eyes of the six justices 
who joined the opinion but not the concurrence.  In other words, based 
upon TWR alone, it is not obvious that the alternative channel doctrine 
had precedential value as a component of the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence.  However, subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court and 
lower courts suggest the opposite.  In FCC v. League of Women Voters,59 
decided the year after TWR, the majority decision of the Court cited 
TWR’s alternative channel doctrine when it struck down the portion of a 
federal statute for funding public broadcasting that prohibited recipients 
of federal funds from engaging in “editorializing” during an election.60  
The law at issue would have denied public funds to public broadcasting 
stations that engaged in such editorializing even if they segregated their 
funds and paid for the editorials with nonfederal funds.61  The Court 
invalidated the funding restriction, reasoning in part that the provision 
denied the stations the alternative channel for speech that made the 
lobbying restriction in TWR constitutional.62  Similarly, in Rust v. 
Sullivan,63 decided in 1991, the Court cited TWR’s alternative channel 
doctrine64 in upholding certain restrictions on the use of Title X family 
planning funds.  In League of Women Voters, the Court cited both the 
main TWR opinion and the concurrence for the alternative channel 
doctrine.65  In Rust, the Court cited the main TWR opinion rather than the 
concurrence for the doctrine,66 thereby making clear its view that the 
doctrine was essential to the TWR majority as well as to the concurrence.  
Similarly, several district courts and courts of appeal have also treated 
                                                          
59. 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
60. Id. at 399-400. 
61. Id. at 400. 
62. Id. at 400-01. 
63. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
64. Id. at 197-98. 
65. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 399-400. 
66. Rust, 500 U.S. at 197-98 (reiterating the doctrine that the government does 
not violate First Amendment rights by failing to fund certain types of speech as long 
as an alternative means exists to engage in such speech without tax favored funds). 
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the alternative channel doctrine as integral to the decision reached in 
TWR.67 
The alternative channel doctrine, as developed in this line of 
cases, raises questions for the tenability of a network approach in the 
area of campaign finance regulation.  To see this clearly, consider a 
hypothetical 527 group that is established independently of any candidate 
and that is devoted to election-related activities that are not the type to 
trigger FECA registration.  For example, on the expenditure side, the 
hypothetical organization does not engage in or fund express advocacy in 
support of or in opposition to one or more federal candidates; on the 
contribution side, it neither gives money to any federal candidate nor 
solicits funds by promising to support or oppose particular federal 
candidates for public office.68  If that organization is viewed in isolation 
to determine its major purpose, the FEC would examine the group’s 
organizing documents, its public statements about its mission, statements 
made to potential contributors when soliciting funds, internal memoranda 
and other documents, as well as the character of the activities the group 
engages in and expenditures it makes in connection with campaigns.69  
Now, suppose that the organization is also affiliated with a PAC 
registered with the FEC, e.g., that the two groups share offices, a 
website, some or all of their personnel, and some part of their names.  
They may hold joint fundraising events, although they will be careful to 
                                                          
67. See, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(rejecting the plaintiff’s “no alternative channel” argument on the ground that the 
plaintiff could set up a PAC to engage in campaign speech using the intermediary of 
a 501(c)(4) organization).  As part of reaching its conclusion, the court observed that 
Blackmun’s view in TWR was “subsequently confirmed” by the Supreme Court in 
League of Women Voters as “an accurate description of its holding.”  Id. (citing 
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400); see also Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 
Inc. v. United States Agency for Int’l Dev., 430 F. Supp. 2d 222, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (referring to both the main opinion and the concurrence for the proposition 
that the existence of a § 501(c)(4) “safety valve” was necessary to avoid 
constitutional infirmity in TWR).  The Alliance court also stated that when the 
Supreme Court in Rust upheld the regulation, it explicitly cited as one consideration 
the fact that grant recipients had an alternative channel for abortion-related 
messages.  See id. at 259. 
68. For the standard assumed by this hypothetical, see FEC Notice 2007-3, 
supra note 10, at 5604-5605; 11 C.F.R. § 100.57 (2007). 
69. See FEC Notice 2007-3, supra note 10, at 5601. 
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route hard money contributions to the PAC and other contributions to the 
unregistered 527 group. Under a network approach it would seem that, to 
an as yet unspecified degree, the PAC’s purposes, statements, 
solicitations, internal documents, and activities would be taken into 
account in assessing the unregistered 527 group’s mission and major 
purpose.  A similar analysis could be applied to organizations described 
in § 501(c) that are part of a network, if one or more members of the 
network are engaged in FECA-type campaign activities.70 
A network approach thus seems to require a 527 group or other 
exempt organization seeking to stay clear of FECA registration to be 
independent of other entities engaged in FECA-type electioneering 
activities, not only in the sense of not coordinating its activities with such 
entities, but also in the more comprehensive sense of not being part of a 
network in which one or more members engage in such electioneering.71  
Arguably, then, a network approach seems to create a situation in which 
the price of obtaining exemption under the Code is to deny certain 
groups two opportunities: first, the opportunity to engage in FECA-type 
electioneering through the alternative channel of a separate affiliated 
entity that registers with the FEC and, second, the opportunity even to 
affiliate with other entities that so engage. 
Either way, as part of its laudable attempt to attain a more 
realistic assessment of the real world characteristics of organizations 
involved in elections, a network approach would appear to bump up 
against the First Amendment alternate channel doctrine that both justifies 
and circumscribes restrictions on certain types of political speech. 
                                                          
70. It is unclear, based upon TWR, whether a 501(c)(3) organization with a 
501(c)(4) affiliate must be permitted even if the 501(c)(4) engages in electoral 
politics or establishes a PAC for such purposes.  The court in Branch Ministries 
appeared to believe that such an affiliate is constitutionally required.  Branch 
Ministries, 211 F.3d at 143.  However, the court erroneously thought that a 501(c)(4) 
organization is not permitted to engage in political campaign activity unless it does 
so through a PAC.  See id.  It is possible that this erroneous view influenced its 
belief that a 501(c)(4) affiliate was constitutionally required. 
71. A “network effect” would be possible even without coordination between 
the group seeking to avoid registering with the FEC and other members of the 
network, since Weissman and Ryan argue that cumulative activities of a network of 
commonly managed groups should also be considered in a “real world” assessment 
for campaign finance purposes.  See Weissman and Ryan, supra note 13, at 3. 
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IV.  THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, CONTEXT, AND 
ATTRIBUTION 
As Part III suggests, a network approach appears to be in some 
tension with the alternative channel doctrine of Taxation with 
Representation of Washington.  Recall that TWR involved the 
relationship between a § 501(c)(3) and a § 501(c)(4) organization.  The 
501(c)(3) group was entitled to the tax benefit of exemption at the entity 
level, and its contributors were entitled to deduct from their taxable 
income an amount equal to some portion of their donations to the 
501(c)(3) group.72  The problem confronting the Supreme Court was to 
find a way to enable the 501(c)(3) group to lobby certain public officials 
more than an insubstantial amount without having tax deductible 
contributions used to fund the group’s lobbying.  Section 501(c)(4) 
groups also benefit from exemption from income tax at the entity level, 
but they are permitted to lobby as much as is useful to achieve the 
purpose(s) for which their exemption was granted.73  Since they cannot 
receive tax-deductible donations, their lobbying activities are not paid for 
by the deductible contribution subsidy.74  Permitting a 501(c)(3) group to 
use an affiliated entity or partner to engage in the 501(c)(3) group’s 
lobbying thus preserved that group’s ability to lobby lawmakers without 
quantitative restrictions while depriving such speech of funding raised 
through tax deductible contributions.   
A § 527 organization is a political organization that also realizes 
certain tax benefits as a result of its exempt status under § 527 of the 
Code.75  The exact nature of the tax benefits accruing to 527 groups is a 
                                                          
72. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (2000). 
73. See Rev. Rul. 71-530, 1971-2 C.B. 237 (holding that a 501(c)(4) social 
welfare organization may have lobbying as its sole purpose). 
74. Although exemption from income tax alone may provide organizations 
described in any subsection of § 501(c) with a substantial tax benefit, the cases do 
not discuss this benefit in terms of a subsidy.  Similarly, the Tax Expenditure tables 
produced yearly by the U.S. Department of Treasury list deductible contributions as 
a tax expenditure, but do not list exemption under 501(a).  See STAFF OF THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2006-2010 (Comm. Print 2006), 
http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-06.pdf. 
75. I.R.C. § 527 (2000). 
FALR%20SSRN%20DOCUMENT[1].DOC 11/28/2007  2:13 PM 
120 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 6 
 
matter of some debate.  Some commentators have argued that the § 527 
provision relieving such groups’ “exempt function” income76 from 
taxation confers no economic benefit because the law prior to the 
enactment of § 527 did not tax such amounts in any event.77  Current law, 
however, makes clear that the conditions set forth in the statute and the 
regulations must be satisfied for a 527 group to be entitled to exemp 
from income of various types of revenue that will otherwise be subject to 
tax.78  For example, if a 527 group commingles the funds it spends on the 
influencing activities authorized by the statute with the funds it spends 
on other activities, it risks losing the exemption for all the commingled 
funds.  This result suggests that Congress saw § 527 as affording certain 
political groups a tax-preferred status that would not necessarily 
otherwise exist.  Further, most commentators agree that § 2501(a)(4), 
which relieves donors to 527 groups from gift tax exposure for gifts in 
excess of the annual gift tax exclusion, constitutes a benefit to the 
organization as well as to the donors.79  It seems, therefore, that if a 
network approach would cause an otherwise independent 527 
organization80 to be denied the tax benefits of § 527 unless it either 
registers as a political committee subject to FECA’s source, amount, and 
disclosure requirements or gives up the opportunity to partner with a 
political committee subject to FECA, then the approach would deny the 
organization the opportunities for political speech required by TWR, 
Rust, and League of Women Voters.  A similar argument could be made 
                                                          
76. Under I.R.C. § 527(c)(1) (2000), the organization’s taxable income is 
calculated by subtracting its exempt function income and its allowable deductions 
from its gross income.  “Exempt function income” is the organization’s income from 
contributions, member dues, fundraising, or bingo games insofar as it is segregated 
for using to influence, or attempting to influence, “the selection, nomination, 
election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or local public 
office . . . .”  See I.R.C. § 527(c)(3), (e)(2) (2000). 
77. See Roger Colinvaux, Regulation of Political Organizations and the Red 
Herring of Tax Exempt Status, 59 NAT’L TAX J 531, 535-37 (2006); Gregg D. Polsky 
& Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section 527 Organizations, 73 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1000, 1015-16 (2005). The groups are taxed on interest and divided income as 
well as on capital appreciation.  See I.R.C. §§ 527(b)(2), (c). 
78. See I.R.C. § 527 (2000). 
79. See Colinvaux, supra note 77, at 538-39. 
80. The hypothetical posits a 527 group not coordinating with a candidate, 
party, or a committee of either. 
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in connection with exempt organizations described in § 501(c), if they 
risked losing their status because they maintained a close relationship 
with a political committee subject to FECA. 
A second obstacle to applying a network approach is the fact that 
the legislative history of § 527 of the Code specifically provides that, if a 
501(c) organization establishes an affiliated 527 group, the activities of 
the 527 group will not be attributable to the 501(c) organization.81  After 
making clear Congress’ “expectation” that eligible 501(c) organizations 
would establish the separate entities authorized by § 527 to fund any 
campaign-related activities the organizations intended to sponsor, rather 
than continue to engage in such activities as part of their own 
operations,82 the legislative history states that, if a § 501(c) organization 
establishes and maintains a 527 political organization, the latter will be 
“treated as an entity which is separate from the exempt organization 
maintaining the fund.”83  As a consequence, amounts funneled through 
the exempt organization to the 527 organization will not be treated as 
having been spent by the exempt organization or as taxable to it as long 
as the exempt organization transfers the money to the 527 group 
promptly.84  By the same token, even though tax law caps the amount of 
campaign activities that a 501(c) group can engage in as a condition of 
retaining its exempt status,85 a 501(c) group permitted to establish a 527 
organization will not put its exemption at risk no matter how much 
                                                          
81. Section 501(c)(3) groups, however, are not permitted to set up 527 political 
organizations.  See infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
82. See S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at 30 (1974) (observing that taking “the 
campaign-type activities . . . entirely out of the section 501(c) organization[ ] [would 
be] to the benefit both of the organization and the administration of the tax laws”) 
(alterations added)). 
83. Id. 
84. Id.  The exempt organization will, however, be treated as having spent the 
money for political purposes if it earns interest on the funds while they are under its 
control.  Id. 
85. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (2003) (stating that a 
501(c)(4) organization must be “primarily engaged in promoting in some way the 
common good and general welfare of the people of the community”), § 1.501(c)(4)-
1(a)(2)(ii) (2003) (stating that  “[t]he promotion of social welfare does not include 
direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or 
in opposition to any candidate for public office[,]” among other things (alterations 
added)). 
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campaign activity the affiliated 527 group engages in.  In contrast, if 
exempt organizations engage in campaign activities as part of their own 
operations, rather than segregating them in an affiliated 527 group, they 
have to pay a tax based upon the amounts spent on such activities or 
upon their net investment income, whichever is less.86 
The preceding legislative history thus makes clear that Congress 
did not intend the activities of a 527 group connected to a 501(c) 
organization to be attributed to the latter for purposes of determining 
whether the 501(c) organization is entitled to its exempt status.  
Nevertheless, it does not appear that Congress’s reason for characterizing 
the relation between the two types of organization was a general belief 
that the activities of separately organized entities cannot be attributed to 
one another.  That Congress did not hold such a belief is evidenced by 
the fact that it explicitly prohibited § 501(c)(3) organizations from 
establishing a related 527 group.87  Instead, it limited the establishment 
of 527 groups88 to 501(c) organizations that are themselves permitted to 
engage in campaign activities, i.e., to several exempt groups described in 
section 501(c) other than subsection 501(c)(3).89  We can only speculate 
as to the reason why Congress did not authorize 501(c)(3) organizations 
to set up affiliated 527 groups on the condition that funds from the 
former would not be transferred to or used to maintain the latter.  Since a 
structure of this kind would have prevented money attributable to 
deductible charitable contributions from being used to support 527 
groups, Congress’s failure to allow 501(c) organizations this option 
reveals that it  must have been concerned with more than protecting the 
                                                          
86. I.R.C. § 527(f)(1) (2000). 
87. See S. REP. NO. 93-1357, supra note 82, at 30.  This is the case when the 
purpose would be to promote or oppose the election of a candidate to elected office.  
They are, however, permitted to establish a 527 organization to raise and spend 
money in connection with non-elective offices, e.g., to influence the selection of a 
judicial nomination. 
88. Of course, not all 527 groups are connected to another entity.  Section 527 
also contemplates the existence of freestanding 527 groups. 
89. See S. REP. NO. 93-1357, supra note 82, at 30.  The most common 501(c) 
organizations that establish a connected 527 group, and the ones mentioned in the 
Senate Report, are those described in sections 501(c)(4)-501(c)(6), i.e., social 
welfare groups, labor organizations, trade associations, and chambers of commerce.  
Id. 
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public fisc. Based upon the legislative history of § 527, it seems likely 
that the exclusion for 501(c)(3) groups derives from the underlying 
policy objective to keep charities themselves, and not just charities’ 
money, out of political campaigns. Since 501(c)(3) groups are not 
permitted, much less encouraged, to engage in campaign activities even 
minimally,90 Congress did not authorize them to create affiliated, albeit 
separate, 527 groups, as other 501(c) entities can do.  That Congress 
prevented 501(c)(3) organizations from having a connected 527 group 
thus suggests that in its view, the activities of a connected 527 group 
would somehow be attributable to the charity and thus violate the 
prohibition against 501(c)(3) groups intervening in political campaigns.  
This would be the case even though the two organizations would have 
been legally distinct and financially separate.91 
The preceding analysis suggests that the separate legal entity 
paradigm that explained and justified the holding in Taxation with 
Representation of Washington cannot automatically be generalized to 
affiliated entities one of which is engaged in political campaigns.  To 
avoid attributing a significant inconsistency to Congress based upon its 
encouraging some 501(c) groups to establish 527 organizations while 
prohibiting this to 501(c)(3) organizations, it is necessary to reject an 
otherwise plausible assumption that Congress enabled some 501(c) 
groups to create § 527 affiliates because it believed that their separate 
legal existence precluded attributing the activities of one affiliated group 
to another.  It appears more likely that Congress was motivated by 
consistent policy objectives, namely, (1) facilitating the ability of exempt 
organizations already permitted to participate in campaigns to do so 
without threatening their exempt status,  (2) encouraging such groups to 
take the campaign activity “entirely out” of their own operations by 
creating a tax-favored campaign vehicle in which to segregate the 
                                                          
90. The prohibition against political campaign activity by 501(c)(3) 
organizations is absolute.  See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). 
91. When it enacted § 527, Congress chose to allow the host 501(c) 
organization to pay for the cost of setting up and administering the 527 group, 
although the 501(c) organization is not itself permitted to contribute to the 527 
group.  If Congress  had wanted to permit 501(c)(3) organizations to set up 527 
groups as long as no money or other property flowed from the former to the latter, it 
could have provided that 501(c)(3) organization could set up 527 groups but not pay 
the administrative costs of setting them up or maintaining them. 
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campaign activity, and (3) reinforcing the policy against 501(c)(3) 
organizations engaging in campaign activity either directly or 
indirectly.92 
The Internal Revenue Service enlarged the statutory framework 
created by Congress when the Service explicitly blessed the existence of 
organizational networks consisting of a § 501(c)(3) charity affiliated with 
an organization described in another subsection of 501(c) that has, in 
turn, established an affiliated 527 political organization.  For example, in 
a training manual for its agents, the IRS asserts that a 501(c)(3) 
organization can create a 501(c)(4) organization which, in turn, can 
create one or more 527 organizations without jeopardizing the 
501(c)(3)’s charitable exemption as long as the groups “do not 
commingle their finances or other resources, conduct separate activities 
in furtherance of their exempt purposes, and maintain and respect their 
separate entities.”93  Further, the IRS training manual blesses such 
networks of affiliated organizations even when all members of a network 
have a distinctive name in common.94 
The IRS position arguably allows 501(c)(3) organizations to 
circumvent Congress’s ban on 501(c)(3) organizations establishing 527 
                                                          
92. See S. REP. NO. 93-1357, supra note 82, at 30. 
93. Judith E. Kindell & John F. Reilly, Election Year Issues, 335, 477-78 
(2002), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/topici02.pdf  (offering examples involving 
state PACs and federal PACs).  The 501(c)(3) organization cannot contribute any 
funds to any of the PACs connected to its affiliated 501(c)(4) organization (Example 
11), nor earmark any funds it provides to an affiliated organization for campaign 
activity (Example 6).  See id. at 479, 475-76.  Although the IRS warns in the 
introduction to the training manual that the doctrines and examples discussed there 
cannot be relied upon by taxpayers in a court of law, this and other training manuals 
are widely studied and relied upon as indicating the Service’s understanding of the 
issues discussed. 
94. Id. at 479 (offering as a permissible network the Downtown Business 
League (a 501(c)(6) organization), the Downtown Business League Education Fund 
(a 501(c)(3) organization), and the Downtown Business League PAC (a 527 
organization), at  477 (noting that a 501(c)(3) entity cannot contribute to a 527 group 
even if the 527 group is part of a network of affiliated organizations that includes the 
501(c)(3) entity).  Cf. id. at 475-76 (noting that a 501(c)(3) entity can pay 
membership fees to a 501(c)(6) trade association that engages in political campaign 
activity as long as the 501(c)(3) group does not earmark any of its contributions for 
such activity).  Given that money is fungible, the membership fees permitted a 
501(c)(3) organization would free other 501(c)(6) funds to spend on campaigns. 
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groups.95  At the very least, its position seems to contravene the general 
tax policy against permitting a taxpayer to avoid undesirable tax 
consequences by creating a series of formally distinct transactions to 
accomplish what is in substance an integrated transaction.96  It may be 
this tax policy, in whole or in part, that led Congress to deny 501(c)(3) 
organizations the ability to establish their own 527 affiliates.  In contrast, 
the Service’s position permitting 501(c)(3)–501(c)(4)–527 organization 
networks appears to derive from its longstanding policy of respecting 
corporate or entity boundaries.97  In the exempt area, this policy appears 
prominently when the IRS considers whether the operations of an exempt 
organization’s taxable subsidiary or subsidiaries should affect the 
organization’s own exempt status or its liability for tax on unrelated 
business income.98  Both the Service and the courts suspend this policy if 
separate entities are created to avoid taxes, for example, to shift income, 
if they disregard the entity boundaries themselves, or if one entity serves 
solely as the agent or instrumentality of the other.99 
The test used to determine if organizations’ boundaries should be 
respected when for-profit entities are involved is often characterized in 
terms of business purpose or economic reality.100  The criteria employed 
                                                          
95. See Chris Kemmit, RFRA, Churches and the IRS: Reconsidering the Legal 
Boundaries of Church Activity in the Political Sphere, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145, 
161 (2006) (describing how churches have formed related 501(c)(4) organizations  
with PACs to conduct campaign activities).  See supra note 70. 
96. See Penrod v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1415, 1427-28 (1987) (stating “the 
fundamental principle of tax law that the substance of a transaction, and not its form, 
controls its tax consequences”). 
97. This policy is based upon Moline Prop., Inc. v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436 
(1943) (holding that income of a corporation could not be passed through to the sole 
stockholder for income tax purposes because it belonged to the corporation as a tax 
entity). 
98. See Evelyn Brody, Business Activities of Nonprofit Organizations: Legal 
Boundary Problems, in NONPROFITS AND BUSINESS (C. Eugene Steuerle and Joseph 
Cordes, eds. forthcoming 2008);  Francis R. Hill and Douglas M. Mancino, 
TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 27–6 to 27-10 (2002). 
99. See Moline Prop., 319 U.S. at 440; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-02-046 (Oct. 
18, 2004); and infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. 
100. See Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1135, 
1151-52 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that a parent corporation could deduct premiums 
paid to its wholly owned subsidiary insurance company because the latter had a valid 
business existence, its business operations were separate from those of the parent, 
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in determining whether entity boundaries will be respected in 
circumstances involving nonprofits seem to be less clear cut.  For 
example, entity boundaries may be disregarded where one entity is an 
“integral part” of the operations of another.  In such situations, an entity 
that does not qualify as exempt in its own right is typically seeking to 
gain exempt status by virtue of its relationship with an organization that 
is exempt.101  Qualitative considerations enter into this determination, 
seemingly to a greater extent than with for-profits.  Entity boundaries 
have also been disregarded between nonprofits if two or more entities 
share directors, officers, employees, facilities, or services, but only if one 
or more of the entities exercises significant control over the daily 
operations of one or more of the others in addition to these common 
features.102 
In a Technical Advice Memorandum (TAM) issued in 1999, the 
IRS stated its belief that, in addition to considering the operations 
conducted by an exempt entity,103 “it is also important to review 
preceding and contemporaneous activities and motivations of related 
organizations and individuals” in order to determine an entity’s exempt 
status.104  The organization under review in the TAM was the Progress 
and Freedom Foundation, a group created to develop, market, and 
distribute materials for college courses taught by Newt Gingrich (then a 
member of the House of Representatives), publish newsletters and books, 
and hold conferences.105 
                                                          
and it insured a significant amount of risk for unrelated parties).  Cf. Humana Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 881 F.2d 247, 254-55 (6th Cir. 1989) (contrasting the business purpose and 
economic reality doctrines). 
101. See Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm’r, 100 T.C. 394 (1993), aff’d, 30 
F.3d 494 (3rd Cir. 1994); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,830 (Aug. 30, 1990); Rev. 
Rul. 75-282, 1975-2 C. B. 201; Rev. Rul. 68-26, 1968-1 C. B. 272; Hill and 
Mancino, supra note 98, ¶ 27.04. 
102. See Hill and Mancino, supra note 98, ¶ 27.03. 
103. Or an entity applying for exemption. 
104. Unreleased IRS Technical Advice Memorandum issued to the Progress 
and Freedom Foundation, Facts, Part II, in 23 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 512, 520 
(1999) (hereafter the “PFF TAM”).  This TAM was also published by Tax Analysts, 
Tax Notes Today (Feb. 5, 1999), Doc 1999-5081 (1999 TNT 24-25). 
105. These and other educational activities of PFF are summarized in the PFF 
TAM, id. at 519-20. 
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Among other issues, the Service examined whether the Progress 
and Freedom Foundation had provided a substantial private benefit to 
individuals or to other organizations, such as the Republican Party, 
which would have disqualified it for exemption as a 501(c)(3) 
organization.106 Understanding the Foundation’s “context” was critical to 
this inquiry, according to the IRS, and a significant portion of the 
seventy-three page ruling was devoted to the contextual inquiry.107  The 
Service based its contextual approach on the mode of analysis employed 
by the Tax Court in American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner,108 
which it cited.109  However, in contrast to the Tax Court, the IRS stated 
in the TAM that it would look to an organization’s “association with 
outside entities only where there is already evidence of private benefit in 
the activities of the organization at issue.”110 
It is unclear how these precedents would be applied to networks 
of exempt organizations, some or all of which are engaged in campaign 
activity.  As was discussed earlier, in Regan v. Taxation with 
Representation of Washington the Supreme Court reduced the relevant 
tax law inquiries when a 501(c)(3) organization establishes a 501(c)(4) 
entity to lobby on its behalf to determining whether the two entities have 
completely segregated their finances and maintain records to verify this 
arrangement.111  Based on the Court’s reasoning in TWR, it seems that the 
presence of common directors or staff, shared facilities, or similar 
organizational names are not relevant to the question of respecting entity 
boundaries. 
How can the approach adopted in TWR be reconciled with the 
approach taken by the Progress and Freedom Foundation TAM?  TWR 
                                                          
106. See id. at 530-34 (discussing whether the Gingrich courses improperly 
benefited the Republican Party and concluding that they did not). 
107. See id. at 520-25, 533-534. 
108. 92 T.C. 1053 (1989). 
109. See PFF TAM, supra note 104, at 533 (contrasting the contextual 
approach of American Campaign Academy with the approach of other decisions).  In 
American Campaign Academy, the Tax Court examined the exempt entity’s 
relationship with the Republican Party, its committees and agents, and Republican 
candidates and officeholders in addition to examining the educational programs that 
it conducted.  See 92T.C. at 1070-73. 
110. PFF TAM, supra note 104, at 533. 
111. 461 U.S. 540, 544, n.6 (1983). 
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involved lobbying, not campaign activity, and the relationship analyzed 
was between organizations described in § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4).112  
The Progress and Freedom Foundation TAM examined the exempt status 
of a 501(c)(3) entity with ties to a § 527 political organization.  In the 
TAM, the Service inquired into the programs, founders, directors, and 
sources of funding of the two entities.113  The difference between the two 
approaches may be that the concern in TWR was exclusively the need to 
prevent money raised through contributions entitled to the charitable 
deduction from being used for lobbying, whereas the concern in the 
TAM was whether the exempt entity was operated in substantial part for 
private benefit.  In other words, the issue in the TAM was the threshold 
question of the character of the organization’s mission. 
Private benefit may sometimes occur through financial 
enrichment, as is the case when an exempt organization enters into a 
contract and the primary purpose is to profit the other party to the 
contract rather than to facilitate the mission that qualified the 
organization for exemption in the first place.114  Private benefit also 
occurs when an exempt organization operates, in whole or in part, to 
further the purposes of a third party, whether an individual or a group.  
For example, in the American Campaign Academy case, the school in 
question trained young adults to become political “campaign 
professionals.”  The Tax Court found that because of the partisan nature 
of the admissions process and some of the courses, the fact that the 
school was exclusively financed by sources associated with the 
Republican Party, and the circumstance that most, if not all, of the 
                                                          
112. In TWR the plaintiff was a 501(c)(3) group that had assumed the lobbying 
activities of its former 501(c)(4) affiliate, so there was a single organization in 
existence at the time of trial.  The relationship between § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) 
organizations was raised by the Court as part of its determination that the 501(c)(3) 
group would not be harmed by its holding, since it could establish an affiliated 
501(c)(4) group to perform a substantial amount of lobbying on its behalf. 
113. See PFF TAM, supra note 104, at 519, 522-23, 526-28, 533-34. 
114. Not all private benefit disqualifies an exempt organization, even a charity.  
For example, educational institutions provide a substantial private benefit to 
individual students (even if society also benefits from an educated citizenry 
indirectly).  However, in most cases the students will be considered to form a 
charitable class and, thus, the benefit they receive is not in conflict with the idea of 
charitable exemption. 
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graduates went to work for Republican officeholders or committees, the 
school conferred a substantial private benefit on the Republican Party, 
even though a large part of the curriculum was nonpartisan and 
academically rigorous in nature.115  Since Republican Party sources 
supplied most of the school’s operating budget, the Party did not benefit 
financially from the school directly or in the short run. Yet it clearly 
benefited by the increased pool of knowledgeable Republican-oriented 
campaign professionals.  As a result, the school’s mission was hybrid in 
nature—partly educational and partly partisan—and the partisan element 
disqualified it for 501(c)(3) exempt status. 
The Progress and Freedom TAM and the American Campaign 
Academy decision thus provide a legal basis for distinguishing Taxation 
with Representation of Washington.  The former two rulings focus on the 
nature of an exempt organization’s mission, and for that inquiry it may 
be appropriate to inquire into an exempt entity’s relationships with 
external parties, whether individuals or groups, as part of the process of 
determining the purpose for which the entity exists and operates.  Such 
an inquiry should not undermine First Amendment values, whether of 
speech or association, because an organization is not entitled to exempt 
status in the first place unless it operates primarily for the purpose that 
supports the exemption.  In the American Campaign Academy case, the 
court concluded that the context in which the school operated 
undermined its claim to exemption as a 501(c)(3) educational 
organization.  In the Progress and Freedom Foundation TAM, in 
contrast, the result of the Service’s lengthy investigation into the context 
in which the Foundation was created and operated resulted in upholding 
the organization’s claim to exempt status. 
These findings support the legitimacy of looking at an exempt 
organization’s context as well as its purpose.  That conclusion validates a 
network approach for certain purposes of tax law and possibly other legal 
regimes in which speech is restricted to achieve a state interest.  The First 
Amendment cases116 emphasizing the importance of an alternative 
                                                          
115. See American Campaign Academy v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1059, 
1069-73 (1989). 
116. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (challenging the manner in 
which the Department of Health and Human Services enforced a law for the funding 
of family planning services); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 
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channel for expression are not apposite because they revolve around the 
source and use of government funds by entities whose purpose or 
mission is not under review.  When the issue is the use (or abuse) of 
government funding, segregation of accounts rather than separation of 
entities is adequate to address the problem.  It remains to examine how 
First Amendment doctrines developed specifically in the context of 
campaign finance jurisprudence would affect the speech issues raised if a 
network approach were used to classify organizations as political 
committees for federal election purposes. 
V. THE PLACE OF CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS IN FEDERAL  
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 
The alternate channel doctrine is a constitutional doctrine that 
assumes the propriety, indeed the necessity, of taking into account the 
context in which an organization operates when determining whether its 
First Amendment rights have been violated by regulations restricting its 
political speech in order to preserve the integrity of public funds.  
Recourse to context has also played a role in various situations that are 
regulated by campaign finance law.  Because campaign finance 
regulations impact speech at the heart of democratic processes, a high 
burden of justification is usually imposed upon state actors who would 
impose restrictions on political speech.117 
The FEC examines the context in which organizations operate in 
numerous circumstances.  For example, FECA limits the dollar amounts 
that can be contributed by individuals or groups to candidates or political 
committees.118  These limitations could be easily evaded by one 
organization creating numerous separately organized entities if each 
entity was entitled to the statutory maximum and the related entities 
could then operate in a coordinated manner. To prevent such an outcome, 
FECA requires that the FEC analyze the relationship between two or 
more organizations to determine whether they should be counted as a 
                                                          
(1984) (challenging the manner of the Federal Communications Commission’s 
enforcement of a telecommunications statute). 
117. See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976).  
118. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (2000). 
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single organization for purposes of contribution limits.119  In such 
instances, the FEC does not limit itself to determining formal relations 
between and among entities, i.e., whether one of the entities is a parent or 
sister of another as a matter of corporate law, or whether one has the 
power to direct the affairs of the other through provisions of bylaws or 
contracts.120  Rather, it also examines relations of influence among the 
entities based upon informal practices, whether the entities share 
personnel, whether they have overlapping memberships, or even whether 
the employees of one organization were formerly associated with the 
other.121 The FEC also takes into consideration whether one of the 
entities “had an active or significant role” in creating the related entity 
and whether related entities have “similar patterns of contributions or 
contributors,” suggestive of an informal “ongoing relationship” among 
them.122 Further, when independent entities themselves seek to be 
classified as affiliated with one another so that they can both raise funds 
from their respective memberships for a single PAC, the FEC undertakes 
a similar context-oriented analysis.123 
In a recently published Notice, the FEC addressed directly which 
constellation of facts, taken together, will result in an entity organized 
under § 527 being classified as a political committee and made subject to 
FECA’s disclosure, source, and amount rules.124  The FEC published the 
Notice in response to a directive by the Federal District Court of the 
District of Columbia requiring the agency either to promulgate a rule 
clarifying the conditions that trigger classification as a political 
committee or to explain its reasons for not doing so.125  The Notice 
                                                          
119. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(5) (2000); 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.5(g), 110.3 (2007). 
120. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(g)(2), (3), (4)(ii)(B), (C) (2007). 
121. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.5(g)(4)(ii)(B), (E), (F), 110.3(a)(3)(ii)(B), (E), (F) 
(2007). 
122. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.5(g)(4)(ii)(I), (J), 110.3(a)(3)(ii)(I), (J) (2007). 
123. See FEC Advisory Op. 2002-15, Feb. 19, 2003,  available at  http://saos. 
nictusa.com/saos/searchao?SUBMIT=continue. 
124. See Notice 2007-3, supra note 10, at 5596. 
125. See Shays v. FEC, 424 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Shays II”).  The 
FEC had taken the position that its regulations together with rules promulgated in 
2004 addressed the issue adequately, especially since it had concluded that political 
committee status was best determined on a case-by-case basis.  See id. at 112-13; 
Notice 2007-3, supra note 10, at 5596. However, the court found that the agency had 
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makes clear that the FEC will look to all the facts and circumstances 
surrounding a group’s activities to determine if its major purpose is to 
influence federal elections, and the Notice elaborates the type of 
contextual inquiries that will influence the FEC’s assessment.  For 
example, the agency will look at the representations that a group makes, 
orally or in writing, when it solicits funds and how the group 
characterizes itself and its projects on its website and in internal 
memoranda rather than limit itself to a review of the group’s 
expenditures, organizing documents, and formal statements.126 
Although the FEC’s Notice 2007-3 does not mention the 
existence of networks of organizations as a factor that will contribute to 
its assessment of a group’s classification as a political committee, the 
conciliation agreements executed by the agency and certain 527 groups 
in 2006 reveal that the agency does in fact take network relationships 
into account.  For example, in the conciliation agreement concluded with 
the League of Conservation’s two 527 groups, neither of which had 
registered as a political committee, the FEC noted that the League’s 
associated 501(c)(4) organization (League of Conservation Voters, Inc.) 
had raised funds for the two affiliated 527 groups.127 The agreement also 
recognized that the 501(c)(4) organization, the two 527 groups, and a 
League of Conservation Voters PAC (registered with the FEC) jointly 
                                                          
failed to explain adequately its decision to proceed through adjudication rather than 
through rule making and it deemed the agency’s actions insufficient to put entities 
on notice of the circumstances creating an obligation to register.  See Shays II at 114, 
116.  Thus, the court remanded the case to the FEC “either to articulate its reasoning 
for its decision to proceed by case-by-case adjudication or to promulgate a rule if 
necessary.”  Id. at 103.  FEC Notice 2007-3 was the agency’s response.   See supra 
note 10. 
126. See Notice 2007-3, supra note 10, at 5601-02, 5605.. 
127. See Conciliation Agreement in MUR 5753 (2006), at 7, available at 
http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocs/00005905.pdf (noting that raising contributions in 
excess of $10,000 was “[o]ne of the primary responsibilities of LCV Inc.”) 
(alteration added)).  Nonetheless, the agency chose not to assert violations of FECA 
by the 501(c)(4) organization.  Id. at 12.  That the FEC is willing, under the right 
circumstances, to bring an enforcement action against a 501(c)(4) group that fails to 
register as a political committee can be seen from its conciliation agreement with 
Freedom Inc., a 501(c)(4) group.  See Conciliation Agreement in MUR 5492 (2006), 
available at http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocs/00005949.pdf. 
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funded the main project undertaken by the organizations together.128  In 
analyzing the major purpose of the League’s 527 groups, the FEC cited 
the electoral objectives of that project and treated the four “LCV 
organizations” as engaged in a joint enterprise.129  For the FEC, then, to 
determine whether a 527 organization should be classified as a political 
committee, it is necessary to view the organization’s activities and 
statements in context, and this inquiry may include considering whether 
and how the organization interacts with affiliated organizations. 
The FEC’s contextual approach, as it was employed in 
connection with a different provision of federal campaign finance law, 
was recently challenged successfully in the Supreme Court.130  The 
plaintiff in the case was Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., a corporation 
exempt under § 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code as an advocacy 
organization.131  The plaintiff challenged the provision of federal 
campaign finance law that prevents corporations from paying for 
“electioneering communications” using their general treasury funds, 
rather than the hard money in their PACs, insofar as that provision 
required the organization to use hard money to pay for communications 
that it believed constituted grass roots lobbying.132 
Congress’s purpose in enacting the electioneering 
communication provisions was to end the common practice of unions 
and corporations using soft money to pay for advertising that purported 
to advocate for issues or legislation, but that was really intended to 
                                                          
128. See Conciliation Agreement in MUR 5753, supra note 128, at 8. 
129. See id. at 8-9. 
130. FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007). 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 2665.  Electioneering communications, a category of campaign 
speech introduced as part of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform, are 
public communications that mention a candidate for federal office, are made on the 
eve of a primary or general election, and are conveyed using broadcast or similar 
media.  See 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f)(3)(A), 441b(c) (2000).  Communications utilizing 
cable or satellite are also covered, and the provision is applicable during the sixty 
days preceding a general election and thirty days preceding a primary.  See 2 U.S.C. 
§§ 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(II) (2000).  The operative provisions of FECA require that 
corporations and unions pay for such communications with hard money, rather than 
their general treasury funds, and that any person or entity who makes or funds such 
communications must comply with special reporting requirements when the sums 
involved in a year exceed $10,000.  See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b(b)(2), 434(f) (2000). 
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influence the election of one or more federal candidates and was likely to 
have such an effect.  The ads could claim to be something other than 
endorsement of or opposition to a candidate for federal office because 
they would refer to an issue or pending legislation and urge listeners or 
viewers to contact a candidate and tell him or her the caller’s opinion 
about the issue or legislation.  However, the issues chosen were 
invariably defining issues in the election in the district targeted to receive 
such ads, and the substantive discussion of the issue in the ads was 
relatively modest.  The ads were understood by most of those who heard 
them as intended to mobilize voters in support of or in opposition to 
particular federal candidates.  Further, because ads of this type tended to 
be taken off the air the day after an election, even if the issue referred to 
was still unresolved or the legislation was still pending, the ads were 
widely viewed as electioneering masquerading as issue advocacy so that 
they could be financed with soft money.133 
The content of the ads under discussion in Wisconsin Right to 
Life was devoted to the subject of filibustering judicial nominations in 
the Senate.134  The ads disparaged senators who used filibusters as a 
device to delay or prevent judicial nominations from being considered on 
the floor of the Senate, and they urged listeners to contact their two 
senators, who were named, and to communicate the listeners’ opposition 
to filibustering in the Senate.  Based on the literal text, the ads did not 
appear to involve campaigning for or against either of the state’s 
senators, only one of whom was up for reelection.135  The background of 
the ads, in contrast, suggested strongly that the ads were intended to 
attack Senator Feingold, who was seeking reelection and who had joined 
in filibustering certain judicial nominations.136  As a consequence, the 
                                                          
133. See the discussion in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126-29 (2003). 
134. See Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2660-2661. 
135. The ads did not mention the campaign or a political party, identify either 
senator as a candidate (only Russell Feingold was up for re-election), or speak to a 
candidate’s qualifications for office.  See id. at 2667. 
136. See id. at 2667-69 (summarizing and rejecting the FEC’s position), id., at 
2697-99 (Souter, J., dissenting);  Brief of Appellant Petitioner at 43-48, FEC v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007) (No. 06-969).  Cf. Wisconsin Right 
to Life, 127 S.Ct. at 2684 n.8 (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that the “purpose of 
the ad was to put political pressure upon Senator Feingold to change his position on 
the filibuster—not only through the constituents who accepted the invitation to 
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Court’s holding depended largely on whether it would look beyond the 
four corners of the text of the ads to the larger context in which the ads 
were produced and aired as part of the process of determining whether 
they should be classified as discussion or advocacy of issues, on the one 
hand, or electioneering with respect to candidates, on the other. 
Both the plaintiff organization and the FEC agreed that the ads in 
question conformed to the definition of “electioneering communications” 
in FECA and, thus, that they must be paid for with hard money unless the 
Court found the statutory provision unconstitutional as applied to the 
facts of the case.137 The FEC argued that the character of the ads could 
not be evaluated without looking at the context in which they were 
written and aired because the relevant legal standard included 
determining whether the organizations intended to influence the federal 
election with the ads and the ads were likely to have that effect.138  The 
Supreme Court disagreed.  It ruled that to avoid unconstitutionally 
burdening the speaker, the ads must be judged without reference to their 
context, or with only a minimal reference to context.139  So judged, the 
Court concluded, the ads were neither express advocacy nor its 
functional equivalent.140  As a result, the Court concluded that the 
                                                          
contact him, but also through the very existence of an ad bringing to the public's 
attention that he, Senator Feingold, stood athwart the allowance of a vote on judicial 
nominees”). 
137. See Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2663.  The Supreme Court had 
upheld the electioneering provisions against a facial challenge four years earlier, in 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. at 189-94. 
138. See Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2663-2664. 
139. See id. at 2664-66.  The Court allowed that courts “need not ignore basic 
background information that may be necessary to put an ad in context—such as 
whether an ad ‘describes a legislative issue that is either currently the subject of 
legislative scrutiny or likely to be the subject of such scrutiny in the near future.’”  
Id. at 2669.  Thus, it seems that the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth ads disputing 
aspects of Senator John Kerry’s Vietnam service would not qualify as issue ads 
under the Court’s definition, since they addressed the character and fitness for office 
of a candidate rather than a legislative proposal under consideration or likely to be 
considered by Congress in the near future.  But see id. at 2683 n.7 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (conjecturing that the majority’s holding “arguably protects” the Bill 
Yellowtail ad that the McConnell Court considered the paradigmatic case of a sham 
issue ad). 
140. See id. at 2670. 
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electioneering communication provisions of FECA would violate the 
First Amendment if they were enforced against the plaintiff in the case. 
Although the question decided in Wisconsin Right to Life is quite 
different from the question examined in this Article, the two situations 
have in common the propriety of relying on contextual inquiries for 
purposes of determining whether an organization’s political speech is 
subject to regulation consistent with the First Amendment.  At the same 
time, the differences between the issues adjudicated in Wisconsin Right 
to Life and the issues surrounding the classification of organizations as 
political committees suggest that the Supreme Court’s insistence on 
disregarding context in the former situation will not necessarily carry 
over to the latter. 
First and foremost, the Court in Wisconsin Right to Life was 
concerned that an “intent-and-effect” standard would introduce an 
unacceptable amount of subjectivity into the analysis of political 
speech.141  The Court asserted that, because of the nation’s “profound 
commitment” to robust debate on “public issues,” interpretive 
approaches such as safe harbors were preferred, and intent-and-effect 
analysis was impermissible.142  Quoting Buckley v Valeo, the Court 
concluded that an intent-and-effect standard “would afford ‘no security 
for free discussion.’”143  In contrast, the process of determining whether 
an organization operating as part of a network should be classified as a 
political committee would rely on relatively objective criteria.  As noted 
earlier, to determine an organization’s correct classification, the FEC 
would look at overlapping or shared directors and officers and similar 
objective indicia of common management, as it already does when it 
examines the relationships among organizations to ascertain whether 
contribution limits are being evaded by affiliated organizations or to 
permit distinct entities to fund a single PAC jointly.144 It would look at 
the representations that groups make to their supporters and potential 
contributors about the nature of their activities and objectives, rather than 
attempt to discern what people are thinking and how audiences are 
reacting to them.  For example, if an unregistered group operating as part 
                                                          
141. See id. at 2665-66, 2668. 
142. See id. at 2665. 
143. Id. 
144. See supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text. 
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of a network of affiliated entities promises its supporters that the impact 
of their contributions, which will not be spent on express advocacy, will 
nonetheless be to further the election prospects of one or more specific 
candidates because of the aggregate impact of the activities of the 
members of the network, then the aggregate impact of the network 
relationships should be an important factor in the FEC’s assessment of 
the group’s character.  Similarly, if such a group focuses attention on its 
relationship with its affiliated organizations—e.g., by sharing a 
letterhead and logo, or by holding joint fundraising events that are geared 
to the election or defeat of specific federal candidates—this conduct 
should be considered as part of the process of classifying the group for 
FECA purposes.  Some of the FEC’s inquiries would involve a greater 
degree of judgment, however. For example, the FEC might look at 
common patterns of contributions and contributors between and among 
members of a network as part of its determination.  Although such 
considerations are arguably less objective because they are less clear cut, 
the FEC already is required to make exactly such judgments to determine 
how to treat related entities for other purposes.145  The element of 
judgment would be the greatest when the FEC engages in weighing the 
various factors to make its final determination.  Yet here too, the agency 
would be engaging in exactly the kind of balancing that it undertakes 
routinely as part of characterizing the relationships among related entities 
for other purposes.146 
Second, and relatedly, the Supreme Court in Wisconsin Right to 
Life also expressed concern that the FEC’s interpretation of the 
electioneering communication provisions of FECA would open “the door 
to a trial on every ad within the terms of [the definition of electioneering 
communications].”147  The determination of an entity’s classification, in 
contrast, would have to be made only once or at infrequent intervals 
because the basis for the determination would be structural rather than 
transactional.  The burden imposed would be no greater than occurs 
currently when the FEC undertakes to ascertain the extent and character 
of relations among two or more entities for purposes of other provisions 
                                                          
145. See id. 
146. See, e.g., FEC Advisory Opinions 2007-13, 2005-17, 2004-41, 2002-15, 
1996-50. 
147. See Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S.Ct. at 2665-2666 (alteration added). 
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of FECA.148  When the classification is made at the entity level, rather 
than at the level of specific communications, the goals or missions of 
institutions are the object of inquiry, rather than the motivations behind 
particular actions or actors.  As a consequence, the type of evidence 
implicated is different.  When the parties disagree about the correct 
assessment of an organization’s mission, and thus about the validity of 
the FEC’s determination that an organization should be classified as a 
political committee, the relevant contextual data will be derived from 
relatively objective indicia, such as the organization’s conduct (and the 
conduct of the affiliated groups that comprise its network), rather than 
the subjective criteria of individuals’ thoughts and feelings.149 
Finally, in Wisconsin Right to Life, the FEC’s contextual analysis 
would have to be made during the two months preceding an election or 
the month preceding a primary.  At such times, it would be difficult for 
the agency to render a decision quickly enough to satisfy First 
Amendment concerns raised by restricting political speech on the eve of 
an election.  In contrast, members of a network could seek the FEC’s 
classification of their organizations before an election cycle begins or in 
its early stages so that a decision could be rendered in time for the 
entities involved to know which campaign finance regulations would 
apply to each of them. 
In short, the circumstances that caused the Supreme Court to 
break the “tie”150 in favor of the speaker whose campaign speech in the 
final two months of a campaign would be subject to the burden of being 
funded with hard money if it aired its messages using broadcast media 
need not be present in the context of classifying members of a network to 
determine which ones, if any, must register with the FEC as a political 
committee. When organizations operate through networks that are 
commonly managed, the structural arrangements that they create and 
through which they operate, and the representations about their mission 
                                                          
148. See supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text. 
149. A network approach does, however, make certain assumptions about the 
differing impact on candidates and officeholders of the activities of single 
organizations as compared with those operating as part of a network that includes 
entities explicitly attempting to influence the election or defeat of individual federal 
candidates. 
150. See Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S.Ct. at 2669, and n.7. 
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that they make in public and private pronouncements, should contribute 
to their classification for FECA purposes in the same way that the 
character of their own activities contributes to that assessment.  This 
result is required by the need to prevent corruption and the appearance of 
corruption in campaigns—the goal that both justifies and restrains the 
regulation of campaign speech.151  Thus, the Court’s decision in 
Wisconsin Right to Life should not be a bar to classifying individual 
organizations active in political campaigns while operating as part of a 
network based, in part, upon examining their network relationships. 
CONCLUSION 
The test of the preceding account of a network approach to 
classifying entities as political committees is whether, or the degree to 
which, they meet the objectives outlined in the beginning of this Article.  
The single most important test of campaign finance restrictions is 
whether they have as their touchstone avoiding corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.  The argument of Part I of this Article is that 
the potential for corruption or its appearance during a campaign can be 
magnified when politically active organizations operate as part of a 
network.  This is largely due to the circumstance that contributors to a 
network’s members may appear to be giving to individual candidates and 
parties sums far in excess of the amounts permitted under campaign 
finance contribution limits because they can augment the influence of 
their hard money contributions with unlimited amounts of unregulated or 
soft money. Because of the constitutional protections afforded political 
speech by the First Amendment, those contribution limits have as their 
sole justification preventing, or at least reducing, the opportunities for 
corrupting or appearing to corrupt candidates for federal office.  A 
network approach to classification would contribute to the goal of 
contribution limits by enabling the FEC to determine that an unregistered 
or soft money organization has influencing the nomination or election of 
specific candidates as its primary purpose based upon both the 
organization’s own activities viewed in isolation and its role in furthering 
a joint enterprise with other members of the network, if such exists. 
                                                          
151. See supra Part I. 
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The second objective of campaign finance regulation is to treat 
similarly situated participants in campaigns equally.  This entails judging 
participants by the functions they actually perform rather than by their 
titles or formal roles.  It is the failure to assess participants by their actual 
functions that creates loopholes or the ability of organizations, events, 
and transactions to make misleading claims about their activities and 
character.  By the same token, it is the failure to assess campaign 
participants functionally that creates public cynicism, since ordinary 
citizens perceive a lack of reality when formal criteria triumph over 
substantive ones, even if they are unable to articulate the difference.  A 
network approach would address this problem with the current tendency 
to apply campaign finance regulations in a vacuum, that is, without 
reference to context, by grounding campaign finance regulation in a 
more realistic understanding of the character and conduct of entities 
active in political campaigns. 
The third test of campaign finance regulation is that it formulate 
rules with sufficient clarity that participants in campaigns are on notice 
of the legal standards by which they will be judged.  This objective is 
dictated by considerations of fairness as well as by the dictates of the 
First Amendment.  The approach advanced in this Article cannot claim to 
achieve this goal perfectly.  In fact, the very considerations that enable a 
network approach to afford a more accurate account of which activities 
and entities influence or seek to influence the prospects of specific 
candidates also render the approach less mechanical and its 
determinations less predictable.  The goal of clarity, therefore, is in some 
tension with the goals of preventing corruption and making judgments 
based upon function rather than form.  This tension is the inevitable 
consequence of attempting to fashion rules to describe and order a 
complex state of affairs, i.e., the conduct of political campaigns.  This 
tension should give regulators pause, but it should not cause them to 
abandon hope for crafting a more realistic framework for campaign 
finance regulation.  A good first step would be to develop a procedure to 
enable organizations already operating as part of networks or 
contemplating a network arrangement to seek a determination from the 
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FEC as to their classification before a campaign is in full swing, rather 
than relying on an audit process after the fact.152 
 
 
                                                          
152. As was noted earlier, many related organizations already seek a ruling of 
this kind from the FEC to determine whether the groups will be considered 
“affiliated” for purposes of the contribution limits.  See supra notes 118-122 and 
accompanying text.  To judge by the Advisory Opinions issued by the FEC in recent 
decades, few groups request a ruling as to their classification as political committees.  
On the relative competence of the IRS as compared with the FEC to regulate 
political activity of 527 organizations, see Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned  and 
Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV. 625 (2007). 
